The growing emphasis on relationship marketing in the marketing literature may lead to the belief that traditional marketing mix variables play a secondary role or no role at all in relational exchanges. In fact, some marketing scholars have minimized the role of traditional marketing variables by arguing that they represent only a partial picture of economic exchanges (e.g., Grönroos 1991 Grönroos , 1994 Gummesson 1997) . Building and maintaining close and strong relationships with buyers seems to be a key concept in the new marketing paradigm (e.g., Berry 1995; Grönroos 1994; Parvatiyar and Sheth 2001; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995) .
Although this argument is strongly shared in the marketing literature, intuition, evidence in the marketplace, and recent empirical research suggest that traditional marketing variables still play a significant role in the way firms conduct their businesses (Coviello et al. 2002; Hultman and Shaw 2003) . The question, then, is why marketing practitioners still invest in traditional marketing variables when developing close relationships with their buyers.
The economic sociology literature, which has claimed that economic transactions are embedded in social relationships, provides a theoretical explanation for the double consideration of traditional marketing variables and relationship marketing variables (Granovetter 1985; Wathne, Biong, and Heide 2001) . Two of the seven principles of embeddedness listed by Hunt and Arnett (2003) can be used to justify the simultaneous use of transactional and relational marketing efforts. The first principle claims that human action should not be oversocialized. This principle advises on the danger of ignoring the importance of the intrinsic economic value of an exchange to the exclusive benefit of its social advantages. The second principle states that the concrete social relations of economic actors have the capacity to either inhibit or enhance the likelihood of attaining desirable economic outcomes. This principle stresses the impact of social relations on the economic outcome of an exchange relationship. The virtue of relationship marketing lies in the fact that some relationship properties enhance desired economic outcomes, both for the buyer and the seller.
Although the relevance of transactional and relational marketing variables seems obvious, knowledge about the conditions of their use is still sparse. Recognizing that both relational and transactional marketing variables involve investments of various kinds, Wathne, Biong, and Heide (2001) have argued that knowledge about their relative effectiveness represents an important input in a firm's resource allocation decisions. The challenge for academics and managers, then, is to make sound predictions on the effectiveness of the two types of marketing activities for different products, customers, and market conditions. It is our belief that formal analytical research approaches can offer a promising alternative for addressing this challenge.
Prior analytical research in marketing has been limited to exploring how sellers determine some of their transactional marketing variables, typically pricing and advertising (e.g., Danaher 2002; Fruchter 1999; Jørgensen, Sigué, and Zaccour 2000) . On the other side, the relationship marketing literature has been mainly behavioral, investigating causal relationships between certain important concepts such as dependence, trust, opportunism, commitment, and satisfaction (e.g., Andaleed 1996; Doney and Cannon 1997; Garbarino and Johnson 1999; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and Sabol 2002) . Other empirical studies have investigated the effectiveness of relationship marketing activities on different behavioral loyalty measures, without devoting any attention to resource allocation (e.g., De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001; Verhoef 2003) . Several conjectures on the effects of transactional and relational marketing have also been made (e.g., Berry 1995; Cahill 1998; Coviello et al. 2002; Grönroos 1991; Saren and Tzokas 1998) . At the same time, a few works have empirically examined the simultaneous use of transactional and relational marketing (e.g., Coviello et al. 2002; Hultman and Shaw 2003) . On the contrary, to the best of our knowledge, there is no analytical work that addresses the simultaneous determination of transactional and relational marketing efforts.
This article is the first analytical attempt at studying the simultaneous determination of transactional and relational marketing efforts and anticipates making two contributions to the marketing literature. The first is to formally integrate social interactions and transactional marketing activities in the formulation of the seller's utility. Building on the economic sociology literature, we claim that the seller's utility, which is a mapping function of the buyer's utility, stems from two sources. The first source of utility is the transactional benefit delivered to the buyer, which is a result of different investments in transactional marketing variables. It can also be considered as the intrinsic value proposition made to the buyer. In the absence of any interpersonal relationship, the buyer only looks at this transactional value proposition in making a buying decision. The second source of utility is the interpersonal component of an exchange, which is captured in this study through the modeling of the commitment of the two partners. Our point of view is that the level of commitment of the exchange partners adds to the seller's total utility. This argument is consistent with the second criterion of embeddedness presented above. The utility derived from relational commitments is manifested in access to new markets, generation of repeat purchases, creation of exit barriers, positive word of mouth, and information sharing (see Anderson 1998; Berry 1995; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Hennig-Thurau, Gwinner, and Gremler 2002; Saren and Tzokas 1998) .
In addition, we consider that the two sources of utility not only are additive but also interact to enhance or moderate the seller's total utility. For example, the fact that the seller makes a relatively low-value proposition may be compensated by the two partners' commitments in the relationship, but it also depends on the magnitude of the buyer's commitment and the seller's own value proposition.
The second contribution of this article is to formally show the value of undertaking transactional marketing in a relational exchange. Such an undertaking has major theoretical and strategic implications. Theoretically, although the thesis of economic transaction embeddedness in social relationships has influenced recent developments in marketing literature, its conceptualization has been vague (Wathne, Biong, and Heide 2001) . Our article addresses this shortcoming and highlights the importance of transactional and relational marketing in the seller's overall utility. We show the relative strategic effectiveness of transactional and relational marketing throughout the life cycle of a relational exchange. In particular, we answer the following questions: Should transactional and relational marketing be given the same weight from the start of a relationship to the end? If not, how should the mix of these two types of marketing activities evolve over time? Although the idea of a relationship life cycle is well established in the literature, its strategic implications have not been fully investigated (see Backhaus 1999) .
To reach our objectives, we extend the model of Fruchter and Sigué (2004) to include the mix of relational and transactional marketing efforts and use dynamic optimization techniques to derive optimal policies.
The remainder of the article is arranged as follows. First, we review some previous related works. Second, we present our model. Third, we derive the seller's optimal policy and discuss some of its consequences. Fourth, we present numerical illustrations that provide insight into the impact on marketing decisions and relational commitment of trust, opportunism, and contributions from transactional marketing and relational commitment to the seller's utility. The last section concludes our article and discusses managerial implications and limitations.
RELATED LITERATURE
Formal decision-making literature in marketing has been mainly focused on marketing mix variables. Its main subject of inquiry has been to find an optimal way of determining individual variables, or a combination of marketing mix variables, that are likely to maximize the seller's current or discounted profits in various conditions of market, competition, and demand (for a review, see Blattberg and Neslin 1993; Moorthy 1993; Rao 1993) . The marketing science literature borrows from the microeconomic literature and, in many cases, uses operations research techniques, including dynamic programming, optimal control, static nonlinear optimization, and static and dynamic games. Generally, this literature assumes that the seller can have a significant short-term and long-term impact on demand, which is expressed as a reaction function of buyers to a seller's manipulation of marketing mix variables.
However, although the marketing science literature often recognizes that some marketing mix variables may have a carryover effect (e.g., Chintagunta and Jain 1992; Jørgensen, Sigué, and Zaccour 2000) , this application has been doubly criticized for being short-term oriented and for overemphasizing economic aspects of an exchange to the detriment of social interactions (e.g., Grönroos 1994; Webster 1992) . Indeed, social interactions between sellers and buyers have been surprisingly ignored in the formulation of sellers' payoff functions. Game theory literature in economics has recognized this problem and investigated the repeat-purchase contract-enforcement mechanism as a way of motivating sellers to honor their promises to buyers (e.g., Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) . Although this literature uses concepts such as reputation and cheating, it does not explicitly deal with critical behavioral variables such as trust and commitment between two exchange partners. Recently, however, Sigué and Elloumi (2002) proposed the first analytical model dealing with social interactions between a buyer and a seller. Borrowing from the modeling of love dynamics in applied mathematics (see Feichtinger, Jørgensen, and Novak 1999; Rinaldi 1998a Rinaldi , 1998b Rinaldi and Gragnani 1998) , these authors use a system of two differential equations to describe the dynamics of relational commitments between two exchange partners. (The use of the metaphor of marriage and love affairs in relationship marketing is not new. See, for example, Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987) ; Gummesson (2002) ; Morgan and Hunt (1994) ; O'Malley and Tynan (2000) .) Their model has the merit of showing formally how factors such as trust, opportunism, and the economic appeal of the partners affect the dynamics of relational commitment. Unfortunately, this model remains descriptive and prescribes no rule for designing a successful marketing program over time. Fruchter and Sigué (2004) make a step forward in integrating social interactions in the formal design of marketing strategies. They recognize that some marketing activities, called relational marketing efforts, can be undertaken to build and maintain relational commitment. Then, the problem of the seller is not limited to the maximization of profit as usually assumed but extends to the maximization of utility stemming from the relational commitment of the exchange partners. The model proposed does not take into account the seller's transactional marketing efforts.
We concur here that the seller's problem is well conceptualized through the maximization of utility. Extending Fruchter and Sigué's (2004) work, we propose a generalized concept of utility, which integrates the following sources of utility: the seller's transactional marketing effort, the commitment of the two partners, and the interaction between the seller's transactional marketing and the buyer's commitment. Our research is based on the premise that the real problem in business today is not which marketing approach to choose but how to combine both transactional and relational marketing to improve the effectiveness of marketing (Coviello et al. 2002) .
THE MODEL The Dynamics of Commitment
We consider a seller who wants to build a long-term relational exchange with a buyer. Let x s (t) be a state variable that measures the level of commitment of the seller in the relational exchange with the buyer at time t. By seller's commitment, we mean the willingness of the seller to stay in the relationship with the buyer, which leads to relational marketing investments or the improvement of the value offered to the buyer. Let x b (t) be another state variable that measures the level of commitment of the buyer in the relational exchange with the seller at time t. By buyer's commitment, we mean customer loyalty, perceived as discernible repeat purchasing or buying behavior, positive word of mouth, and information sharing. There is a reciprocal indifference when the values of x b (t) and x s (t) are zero. This will appear when the partners have no interest in be-ing committed to each other at time t. Otherwise, if the two partners are in a relational exchange, their respective commitment is positive. Thus, we assume
Let us assume that the seller manages the establishment and the maintenance of the relational exchange with the buyer. Although this assumption may seem implicitly restrictive, it is very common in many applications of relationship marketing in consumer markets (see Blattberg and Deighton 1991; Gruen 1995; O'Malley and Tynan 2000) . As a consequence, we accord an active role to the seller in the relational exchange, whereas the buyer plays a passive, or a reactive, role. Stated differently, the seller is the person who offers an economic reward and/or a social or psychological benefit to the buyer. This assumption is implicit in the growing literature of customer relationship management (see Berry 1995; Parvatiyar and Sheth 2001; Sheth and Parvatiyar 1995) .
Let u 1 (t) be a control variable that represents the seller's relationship marketing efforts at time t. The variable u 1 (t) can be any relationship marketing activity from the first two levels of relationship marketing in Berry's (1995) classification. According to Berry, the first level of relationship marketing relies on economic incentives or offers tangible rewards over time to develop and maintain relationships (e.g., frequency marketing programs). The second level of relationship marketing focuses on social aspects of a relationship and offers social and psychological benefits to customers (e.g., special treatment programs and club marketing programs). We assume that whether the seller's marketing effort, u 1 (t), creates economic value or social and psychological benefits for the buyer, it increases the seller's own commitment to the relationship. This specification is consistent with Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer's (1995) view that commitment possesses an input or instrumental component. The seller's relational marketing effort is modeled as a purposeful commitment input that serves to build up the commitment of the buyer as well as provide a bonding mechanism for the seller herself or himself.
The levels of commitment of the two exchange partners evolve according to the following dynamics:
The specification in (1b) assumes that partner i's level of change of the relational commitment is an additive separable function of three terms.
The first term, -β i x i , is the opportunism factor of partner i, in which β i is a positive parameter representing the forgetfulness and selfishness of partner i. Our definition of opportunism is a particular case of what Wathne and Heide (2000) call passive opportunism. The rationale is that people with short memories, purposely or not, harm their partners, who logically expect them to recall their previous commitments. They also do not commit themselves for long periods because their interest in the relationship evaporates rapidly. β i is called the propensity to opportunism and can take smaller values when there are exogenous factors that make it harder for partner i to behave selfishly, such as moral considerations, and the structural and contextual environment of the relationship, which includes the availability of competitive alternatives, specific investments, and binding agreements. For example, a relational marketing program occurring in a context in which both parties share strong norms of solidarity is likely to evolve with low opportunistic propensities from both sides (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) . On the other hand, disproportionate structural investments between the two partners can lead to higher opportunistic propensity from the less involved partner (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995) . In Berry's (1995) classification, some structural investment can be considered as the third level of relationship marketing. As it is difficult to separate these types of activities from the product itself, studies that investigate the effects of relationship marketing often do not take them into account (see De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001; Verhoef 2003) . Following this line, however, we assume that their presence may increase or decrease the partners' propensities to opportunism.
The second term, θ i x j , is the trust/distrust factor, which is a reaction function of partner i to partner j's commitment. A positive θ i means that partner i trusts partner j and relies on partner j's trustworthiness. A negative θ i indicates that partner i distrusts partner j and does not rely on partner j's trustworthiness. Finally, partner i is trust-indifferent to partner j when θ i = 0. Our specification assumes that the commitment of one partner enhances the commitment of the other. It stems from the application of the principle of reciprocity that fosters positive relational exchange (Bagozzi 1995; De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001) .
The third term, α i u 1 , denotes the impact of the seller's relational marketing efforts on the change of her or his own or the buyer's level of commitment at time t. The parameter α i is positive and represents changes in the response of partner i to the seller's relational marketing efforts. In our specification, α b could be considered as the effectiveness of the seller's marketing effort in building and maintaining the buyer's commitment or level of inter-est in the seller's relational marketing effort. There is empirical evidence that α b changes with the nature of the seller's relationship marketing activities and the buyer's characteristics (see De Wulf, Odekerken-Schröder, and Iacobucci 2001; Verhoef 2003) . On the other side, α s indicates the effectiveness of the relational marketing effort on the seller's own commitment. Several factors may influence this effectiveness, including the value of the buyer and the cost of designing and implementing the program. Therefore, we postulate that a relational marketing program that has a high value for the seller and meets the interest of the buyer will generate higher levels of commitment from both sides.
Finally, we assume in (1b) that the levels of commitment of the two partners at the beginning of the relationship are zero. This assumption allows us to determine what level of marketing effort is needed to start a relational exchange. We also consider time-invariant parameters in (1b), in which the exchange partners do not change their opportunistic propensity, trust, and interest in the seller's relationship marketing program. Consequently, our model applies exclusively to exchange partners who favor relational stability and are more likely to remain committed as long as the initial conditions that led to their original commitment do not change. Prior to their commitment, they have hearsay or factual evidence on their partner's trustworthiness, opportunistic propensity, and response to relational investments on which they rely during the time their relational exchange lasts (see Palmer 2000) . This is particularly true because trust about a partner may be built through market intelligence, as is often the case for onetime transactions such as buying a house (Parvatiyar and Sheth 2001) .
The Seller's Problem
The seller's problem is how she or he can manage (establish and maintain) a long-lasting relationship with the buyer and maximize her or his utility. We assume that relational benefits of the seller may go beyond sales and profit and incorporate several other dimensions. As a matter of fact, this is consistent with the view of Parvatiyar and Sheth (2001) that, although the overall purpose of a relational marketing program is to increase marketing productivity and enhance mutual value for the partners, the seller can specify her or his relational benefits (objectives) in terms of financial goals, marketing goals, strategic goals, operational goals, and organizational goals.
The seller may also want to exclusively enhance her or his current economic appeal at time t. Let u 2 (t) be a second control variable that represents this type of the seller's short-term impact marketing activities at time t. Shortterm impact marketing activities are called transactional marketing efforts here as they do not directly affect the dynamics of the commitment of the partners but enhance the value proposition of the seller's at time t. Examples of transactional marketing activities are, among others, coupons, premiums, rebates, bonus packs, and price-offs. As per the definition of sales promotion, transactional marketing includes all activities that offer an extra value to the buyer with the primary objective of creating an immediate sale. It is worth mentioning that neither our definition of transactional marketing nor that of relational marketing includes standard marketing efforts that are indispensable for any exchange to occur between the buyer and the seller. Without any loss, they are normalized here to zero.
Let f be the seller's relational benefit. We assume that the two partners' commitments and the seller's transactional marketing affect the seller's relational benefit; thus, f = f (u 2 , x b , x s ). This assumption stems from the economic sociology literature, which recognizes that partners derive utility from the intrinsic economic value of the object of exchange and their social interactions (see Hunt and Arnett 2003; Wathne, Biong, and Heide 2001) .
The seller supports costs for undertaking relational marketing efforts with a buyer that, according to Hibbard et al. (2001) , encompass economic, psychological, and opportunity costs arising from forgone alternatives. We assume that these costs, as well as the cost of transactional marketing, can be translated to a single unit (e.g., monetary terms) and represented as follows:
The objective of the seller is to find an optimal allocation rule for her or his marketing resources to maximize her or his discounted utility over a planning period. Consider the dynamics of both partners' relational commitments. Then, the seller's problem becomes an optimal control problem formalized as follows:
. .
given (1a). In (2), r denotes the seller's constant and positive discount rate, which can also be considered as the seller's rate of time preference for future utility.
For simplicity, we assume the following specification:
where c T , c b , c s , and c C are nonnegative parameters denoting, respectively, the contribution of the transactional marketing effort, the buyer's and seller's commitment, and the cross-effect of the transactional marketing effort and the buyer's commitment to the seller's overall benefit. Given the generic nature of our model, the contribution parameters can take different interpretations, depending on the relational marketing program being analyzed. For example, suppose that the objective of the seller's relational marketing program is to optimize her or his profit. The parameters c T , c b , c s , and c C may take, respectively, the following interpretations: the effectiveness of transactional marketing, the effectiveness of the buyer's commitment, the internal efficiency gain generated from the seller's commitment, and the cross-effectiveness of transactional marketing and the buyer's commitment on the seller's gross margin. Note the first three components on the right-hand side of (3) are additive separable to take into account the impact of each of them on the seller's relational benefits. This specification also allows us to deal with several types of products in the product continuum proposed by Grönroos (1994) and with several types of buyers. This means that for some products, such as consumer packaged goods, c T may be very high compared to c b and c s ; for other products, such as industrial goods and services, c b and c s may play a greater role. The last component on the right-hand side of (3) denotes the cross-effect of the transactional marketing effort and the buyer's commitment. This component accounts for the interaction that may exist between the intrinsic economic value of the seller's offer and the buyer's commitment to their relational exchange. It means that transactional marketing efforts can be more effective if the buyer is already committed to the seller.
It is important to highlight that by incorporating the seller's commitment into her or his utility function, we are able to take into account the efficiency gain that the seller may generate from maintaining a relational exchange with the buyer (see Kalwani and Narayandas 1995) . On the other hand, not all relational marketing programs generate efficiency gain. Therefore, in some cases, it may happen that, c s = 0. In the specific case of a seller only interested in the profit that she or he may generate directly from the buyer over time, the seller's problem, as stated in (2), will be reduced to maximizing the lifetime value of the buyer (see Berger, Weinberg, and Hanna 2003; Fruchter and Sigué 2004; Gupta and Lehmann 2003; Jain and Singh 2002) .
Finally, a common theme in the marketing literature is that the cost of marketing efforts is a property of increasing returns (i.e., it is a convex function). (Differently said, the marketing effort, or the size of the vector [u 1 , u 2 ], has the property of decreasing return of the cost, C.) With this in mind, again for simplicity, we consider the following specification for the cost of the marketing efforts:
OPTIMAL POLICY
We use dynamic optimization techniques (see, e.g., Kamien and Schwartz 1991) to solve the seller's problem in (2), in which f and C take their respective expression in (3) and (4). We conclude with the following analytical results.
Theorem 1 (optimal decision rules). The utility optimization problem (2)-(4), given (1a), has an optimal timeinvariant feedback solution 1 for the seller's relationship marketing efforts, u 1 * , and transactional marketing efforts, u 2 * . The seller's relationship marketing effort is nonzero if, and only if, the seller and buyer commitments are positive (nonzero). Furthermore, the decision rules are linear functions of relational commitments. Formally, Proof. See Appendix A.
The optimal policy of resource allocation in (5) and (6) displays two explicit analytical decision rules for relational and transactional marketing. Specifically, u 1 * , the seller's optimal decision rule for relational marketing efforts at any instant, is a linear function of the current level of the partners' relational commitments, u x x s b 1 * ( , ), whereas u 2 * , the seller's optimal rule for transactional marketing efforts at any instant, depends linearly only on the buyer's current level of commitment, u x b 2 * ( ). The rule for transactional marketing effort u 2 * , in addition to the linear dependence on the buyer's commitment, depends directly on the contribution made by the transactional marketing effort, the cross-effect of the transactional marketing effort, and the buyer's commitment to the seller's overall benefit. This result means that to determine her or his optimal transactional marketing effort at time t, the seller need only look at the level of commitment of the seller, the contribution stemming from transactional marketing, and the cross-effect of the transactional marketing effort and the buyer's commitment. Interestingly, when there is a cross-effect between the seller's transactional marketing effort and the buyer's commitment, the seller should increase (decrease) her or his transactional marketing effort as the buyer's commitment increases (decreases).
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It is worth mentioning, however, that the feedback transactional marketing effort does not depend directly on the partners' trust/distrust and opportunism, the seller's rate of time preference for future utility, and the other model parameters, but it depends indirectly through the buyer's commitment (see Appendix B).
The dependence of u 1 * on the model parameters is complex and determined through matrix A and vector b (see Appendixes A and C). As it appears (see Appendix C), the decision rule u 1 * depends directly, in addition to the two partners' current level of relational commitments, on all parameters of the model, including the trust/distrust and opportunism parameters of the two partners, the seller's rate of time preference for future utility, and the contribution of the transactional marketing effort and the crosseffect of the transactional marketing effort and the buyer's commitment to the seller's overall benefit.
Considering Theorem 1, we obtain the following result. 
Corollary 1 (marketing efforts without cross-effect).
Proof. See Appendix D.
The results in Corollary 1 apply for a case where the seller's overall benefit from the relational exchange in (3) is limited to only the three first components on the righthand side. The constant optimal decision rules for transactional and relational marketing efforts mean that the seller need not take into account either the time or the current levels of both partners' commitment to determine her or his marketing efforts. Moreover, for the transactional marketing effort, the seller's concern should be limited exclusively to the effectiveness of the transactional marketing effort to her or his overall benefit. Conversely, to determine her or his optimal relational marketing effort, the seller would have to consider the trust/distrust and opportunism of the two partners, the seller's time preference for future utility, and the contribution of the commitment of the two partners to the seller's overall benefit. For the specific case of a seller interested in the lifetime value of the buyer, the seller's relational marketing effort will increase with the increase of the effectiveness of the commitment of the two partners on the seller's gross margin. This implies that the seller should invest more in relational marketing effort if her or his relational marketing program can generate more internal efficiency gain and the effectiveness of the buyer's commitment on the seller's gross margin is high. The seller's relational marketing effort increases with the two partners'trust parameters, but it decreases with the two partners' opportunism and distrust parameters. Practically, these findings mean that an exchange occurring in a structural and contextual environment that does not favor opportunistic behavior among partners or involving two trusting partners should be supported by extensive investments in relational marketing programs.
The results in (9) and (10) also show that if transactional marketing efforts make no contribution to the seller's utility, c T = 0, the seller should allocate all of her or his marketing resources to relational marketing activities.
2. To see this, we take the derivative of u 2 * in (6) with respect to time; thus,
The relational marketing effort should be kept constant over time, without any dependence on the partners' commitments (Fruchter and Sigué 2004) . Combining these results with Theorem 1, we can better understand the effect of transactional efforts. The relational marketing effort acts as a closed-loop strategy (feedback) of the partners' commitments only if the seller adds transactional efforts that contribute directly and interact with the buyer's commitment to her or his utility. Next, we compare the allocation of marketing resources between the two types of marketing efforts. 
Corollary 2 (allocation of transactional and relational marketing). Assume
Then, at the beginning, the seller should allocate more resources to relational marketing. In the long run (steady state 3 ), she or he should allocate more marketing resources to transactional marketing.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Corollary 2 determines when the optimal relational marketing effort should be either higher or lower than the optimal transactional marketing effort. It appears that the issue of whether to allocate more resources to relational marketing or transactional marketing at the earlier stages and at the later stages of a relationship critically depends on all the parameters comprising the dynamics of the relational exchange and the seller's utility function. This result suggests that the allocation of marketing resources between relational and transactional efforts should ultimately take into account the preferences of the buyer and the properties of the relational exchange between the two partners.
To provide more insight on the impact of these properties, a set of illustrative examples using our analytical results is provided in a subsequent section.
NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
Using the analytical results obtained in the previous section, we consider numerical examples to better evaluate and understand the impact of some parameters. More exactly, we focus on analyzing trust, opportunism, and the different contributions to the seller's overall benefit of the seller's decisions and the two partners' relational commitment.
Trust Effects
We set the model parameters to the values given below and change the values of the trust parameters to examine how trust affects the seller's decisions and the two partners' relational commitment. In setting the parameters, we assume partial symmetric partners who hold the same propensity to opportunism and respond identically to relational marketing efforts, as well as a balanced utility function in which transactional marketing and the partners' commitment have the same contribution to the seller's overall benefit.
Propensity to opportunism
Responses to relational marketing efforts c b = c s = c T = c C = 1 Contribution to seller's overall benefit r = 0.1 Discount rate Table 1 provides examples of three cases: The seller and the buyer hold the same level of trust (Case 1), the seller is more trusting than the buyer (Case 2), and the buyer is more trusting than the seller (Case 3). Case 1 is considered a benchmark for complete symmetric partners characterized by mutual desire to commit to a long-term relationship (Sigué and Elloumi 2002) . The superscripts denote the number of the case in Table 1. The partners' commitments and the seller's marketing efforts compare as follows:
As indicated in (12), the two partners' commitment decreases with a decrease of trust either on their own side or on the other partner's. The decrease of a partner's commitment is, however, more obvious when accompanied by a decrease in trust in the other partner. The two partners maintain the same level of commitment if they hold the same level of trust (complete symmetry). As expected, the more trusting partner is also the more committed. The seller diminishes both her or his relational and transactional marketing efforts when the two partners maintain mutual low levels of trust. The diminution of the seller's transactional and relational marketing efforts is more pronounced when the trust of the buyer is lower than when the seller does not sufficiently trust the buyer (13).
Interestingly, depending on the two partners' trust, the seller's emphasis on both transactional and relational marketing changes over time. Although it is advisable for the seller to invest more in relational marketing at the earlier stages, over time, the seller should increase at a greater speed her or his investment in transactional marketing, especially when she or he sufficiently trusts the buyer. At the steady state or even before, particularly when the buyer does not trust the seller, the seller should allocate more marketing resources to transactional activities than to relational activities.
Opportunism Effects
We set the model parameters to the values given below and change the values of the propensity to opportunism to examine how partners'opportunism affects the seller's decisions and the two partners' relational commitment. This setup assumes partial symmetric partners who mutually trust each other at the same level and respond identically to relational marketing efforts, as well as a balanced utility function in which transactional marketing and the partners' commitment have the same contribution to the seller's overall benefit.
Responses to relational marketing efforts c b = c s = c T = c C = 1 Contribution to seller's overall benefit r = 0.1 Discount rate
In Table 2 , we provide three examples: The two partners have the same propensity to opportunism (Case 1), the buyer tends to be more opportunistic than the seller (Case 2), and the seller has a propensity for being more opportunistic than the buyer (Case 3). Again, Case 1 is a benchmark of complete symmetric partners. The superscripts denote the number of the case in Table 2. The partners' commitment and the seller's marketing efforts compare as follows:
u u u
The two partners' commitment decreases with an increase in their own or the other partner's propensity to opportunism (14) . The decrease of a partner's commitment is, however, more prominent when accompanied by an in- crease in their own propensity to opportunism. This finding follows from our specification of commitment in (1b), which assumes a direct influence of a partner's opportunism on his or her own commitment and an indirect influence on the other partner's commitment through the trust factor. Not surprisingly, we found that the partner with the higher propensity to opportunism is also the less committed of the two. The seller diminishes both her or his relational and transactional marketing efforts when her or his propensity to opportunism or the buyer's increases. An increase in the propensity to opportunism in the buyer has a more damaging impact on the seller's marketing investments than an increase of the same proportion in the seller's propensity to opportunism (15). We found also that at the earlier stages, the seller should maintain a higher level of relational marketing, independent of the propensities to opportunism of the two partners. The investment in transactional marketing should, however, increase more rapidly over time and might overtake relational marketing at the steady state, especially when the buyer's propensity to opportunism is low. This result suggests that in a relationship where the buyer is very opportunistic, it can be useful for the seller to maintain a higher level of relational marketing activities (compared to transactional marketing activities) at the steady state, which are more likely to build and maintain a higher level of commitment. Another alternative is to change the buyer's propensity to opportunism through a variety of contractual and managerial mechanisms.
Contribution to the Seller's Benefit Effects
We set the model parameters to the values given below and change the values of the different contributions to the seller's benefit to examine how they affect the decisions of the seller and the two partners' relational commitment. This setup assumes complete symmetric partners who hold the same propensity to opportunism, mutually trust each other at the same level, and respond identically to relational marketing efforts.
Responses to relational marketing efforts
Opportunism coefficients r = 0.1 Discount rate Table 3 gives two illustrations. The first assumes that transactional marketing activities have a higher contribution to the seller's utility (Case 1), and the second assumes the commitment of the two partners contributes more than transactional marketing to the seller's utility (Case 2). We observe that the seller invests in both relational and transactional marketing, according to their contributions to her or his utility. In a context where transactional mar- keting activities are more effective than relational marketing activities (Case 1) over the entire time horizon, the seller will allocate more resources to transactional marketing than to relational marketing. The reverse is also true; that is, relational marketing activities receive more resources if the commitment of the two partners brings more utility to the seller (Case 2). However, the seller's marketing investments in Case 2 increase significantly over time, whereas they tend to be relatively constant over time in Case 1. As the contribution of the two partners' commitment to the seller's utility increases, they both commit more to the relationship. This could be explained by the fact that the seller invests heavily in relational marketing, which has a positive impact on the two partners' relational commitments. An indirect consequence of investment in relational marketing is the increase in transactional marketing activities through the buyer's commitment.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this article, we have proposed an analytical model that allows the formal examination of how a seller should design an intertemporal marketing program that includes transactional and relational activities, to maximize her or his discounted utility. The model provides original answers and asks some intriguing questions of the current relationship marketing literature, such as the following: Are transactional and relational marketing substitutes for each other, or are they complementary? What should be the optimal mix of transactional and relational marketing activities over time in a relational exchange? The model proposed applies exclusively to cases in which the seller invests to establish and maintain relational commitments, and the buyer only reacts to the seller's marketing programs.
Contributions
The emerging paradigm of relationship marketing raises many challenging questions for marketing managers and scholars that, unfortunately, cannot be fully answered by any single research approach or any single article. We hope, however, to have shown here that analytical modeling, which is traditionally associated with transactional marketing, can be broadened to integrate relational marketing activities and social interactions for the enrichment of the relationship marketing literature. The main findings of our analytical model follow.
In a context where the transactional marketing effort and the buyer's commitment exclusively contribute in isolation to the seller's utility, the seller should implement time-and commitment-independent transactional and relational marketing programs. Thus, the seller's concern should be exclusively limited to the effectiveness of transactional marketing efforts (such as sales promotion) on her or his overall benefit or gross margin. Conversely, the seller's optimal relational marketing efforts, such as frequency marketing programs and club marketing programs, should be extensive if they generate internal efficiency gains for the seller and the effectiveness of the buyer's commitment on the gross margin is high. As expected, our findings also suggest that an exchange occurring in a structural and contextual environment that does not favor opportunistic behavior among partners and involving two partners who maintain a significant level of x t x t s b
trust for each other should be supported by large investments in relational marketing programs. These findings build an important bridge between the behavioral research stream, which has investigated opportunism, trust, and commitment in relational exchanges with little attention on decision making (e.g., Dwyer, Shurr, and Oh 1987; Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer 1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994) , and scholars who have been concerned by the effects of relational marketing activities (e.g., Berry 1995; Webster 1992) . They indicate that the assessment of the opportunity of using relational marketing activities should not be limited to customer potential profitability, as some have advocated, but also expand to factors that may enhance or lessen the commitment of exchange partners, such as trust and opportunism.
The transactional marketing effort and the buyer's commitment are likely to contribute separately to the seller's utility when the intrinsic economic value of the seller's offer does not have any direct impact on the buyer's commitment. Some club marketing programs or other relational marketing programs that offer exclusively social and psychological benefits may fall into this category. The Harley Owners Group, sponsored by HarleyDavidson, is one of the oldest club marketing programs aimed primarily at providing club members with a variety of social and psychological benefits. Recently, Martell launched its Martell Elite Club in Hong Kong to offer "a forum for like-minded citizens of the world who have set benchmarks in their fields, and who carry a profound admiration of the finer things in life" (see White 2004) . The benefits for club members are primarily social and psychological. Obviously, although the commitment of these two clubs' members is important to secure future sales for Harley Davidson and Martell, there is no reason to believe that it would allow them to increase their short-term sales in response to their transactional marketing activities. This is because the pleasure of being a member of the club for a buyer could be separated from the pleasure of making a good deal in a given period. Strategically, our findings suggest that without interaction between transactional marketing and the buyer's commitment, it is optimal for the seller to avoid resting on relational commitments and to design a balanced, steady marketing program involving both transactional and relational marketing from the beginning to the end of the relationship.
For scenarios in which the transactional marketing effort and the buyer's commitment contribute jointly to the seller's utility, we have found that the seller's decisions at any time on both transactional and relational marketing follow a feedback decision rule. Frequency marketing programs that reward customers who buy frequently or in large quantities are typical examples of cases in which the effect of transactional marketing activities is combined with the relationship marketing program to generate more utility to the seller. Basically, this means that committed buyers may react more favorably to short-term transactional marketing activities as they also increase their long-term reward. In such a context, besides the parameters listed in the case in which there is no joint contribution, the seller's decisions also involve the buyer's commitment for transactional marketing and the commitment of the two partners for relational marketing. The rules for determining relational and transactional marketing efforts display a very interesting property. The first is a linear function of the commitments of the two partners, whereas the second is a positive linear function of the buyer's commitment. This latter rule is a formal proof that, under certain conditions, transactional and relational marketing are complementary, as relational marketing affects the buyer's commitment positively. In contrast with the current belief that committed buyers may be less sensitive to economic value variations, our findings support the idea that the more buyers are committed, the more sellers may have to improve their intrinsic economic proposition over time with activities such as sales promotion. Strategically, this implies that the buyer's commitment should not be taken for granted. Instead, the seller must keep investing in transactional marketing to offer greater value propositions to committed buyers. This finding is consistent with Kalwani and Narayandas's (1995) argument that in longterm relationships, buyers may become more sensitive to the economic value of sellers' offers and strive to share relational benefits equitably. Indeed, Backhaus (1999) reports that in the health care industry, long-term customers react more to events affecting the quality of services than new customers do.
The allocation of marketing resources between transactional and relational marketing is not limited to the type of product and the profitability of the buyer, as is often claimed in the literature (see Coviello et al. 2002; Grönroos 1994 ), but also depends on several other factors, including the contextual and structural environment of the relational exchange and the reactions of the two partners to the seller's relational marketing activities.
The strategic implications of the numerical analysis of some relational properties are summarized in Table 4 .
Consider a structural and contextual environment in which the propensity to opportunism of the buyer is either low or high and the buyer holds a low or high level of trust in the seller's commitment. We provide a sample of indicators that may favor low-or high-opportunism behavior as well as low or high level of trust (see Doney and Cannon 1997; Wathne and Heide 2000) . The design of an optimal mix of transactional and relational marketing efforts should take into account the buyer's level of trust for the seller and the scope of his or her propensity to opportun-ism. In general, it is advantageous to invest more in relational marketing at the earlier stages of the relationship and, depending on the buyer's trust and propensity to opportunism, to rapidly or gradually increase transactional and relational marketing over time up to the steady state (maturity) of the relationship.
On the other hand, the seller can take actions exogenous to our model to change the buyer's trust and opportunism parameters, as indicated in Table 4. In particular, the level of trust can be enhanced, whereas the propensity to opportunism can be reduced. Such exogenous actions could be long-term formal contracts or binding agreements, structural investments that create additional exit barriers likely to limit the buyer's propensity to opportunism, or any activity that can help to provide the buyer with a positive service experience and strengthen the reputation of the seller.
Finally, the numerical analysis also shows that the contributions of transactional and relational marketing to the seller's overall benefit play a significant role. In a context where transactional marketing activities are more effective than relational marketing activities, over the entire time horizon, the seller allocates more resources to transactional marketing than to relational marketing. The reverse is also true (i.e., relational marketing activities receive more resources if the commitment of the two partners brings more utility to the seller). As the seller's utility is a mapping function of the buyer's utility, our finding supports the notion that the seller should follow a basic requirement of the marketing concept-the satisfaction of customers' needs should drive her or his marketing programs.
Limitations and Future Research
Some of our modeling assumptions can be relaxed to address more complex situations, as in the following three examples. First, we assume that the dynamics of the relational exchange between a buyer and a seller are not influenced by competition. This assumption is restrictive as there is evidence that buyers often consider alternative propositions in their choice of suppliers. An obvious extension of our model should be able to show how the existence of competitive offers affects the seller's optimal relational and transactional marketing decisions and the dynamics of commitment between partners.
Second, we assume an asymmetric relational exchange in which only the seller invests in the two partners' relational commitment. Although this case is common in consumer markets, it does not fit with many business-tobusiness applications of relationship marketing. A possible extension of our model should examine, in a context of a differential game, how the seller and the buyer invest in their relational commitment to reach equilibrium.
Third, although relational marketing programs can easily be implemented for individual buyers, many transactional marketing programs are designed to meet the needs of multiple buyers. In this context, the seller faces a more difficult situation than our present setup, in which she or he designs a complete marketing program for a single buyer. Extending our model to a seller dealing with two buyers would be more realistic to cope with such a challenge. Consider the optimal control problem (2) with the assumption in (1a). The current-value Hamiltonian is given by
where λ b and λ s are the adjoint variables, or, in our context, the net benefit (or damage) of increasing the level of relational commitment of the buyer to the seller and of the seller to the buyer, respectively, by one additional unit. µ b and µ s are adjoint variables associated with the constraints on x b and x s , taking the values
The necessary optimality conditions are given by
The adjoint equations are the following: 
and the boundary conditions are 
where b is as in (8) 
for x b (t) and x s (t). Thus, the solutions will depend on all parameters of the model.
APPENDIX C Matrix A
Matrix A in Riccati equation (7) is symmetric; that is, a 12 = a 21 (to see this, we transpose equation (7)). To find the elements of the matrix (i.e., a 11 , a 22 , a 12 ), we need to solve the following system of three nonlinear algebraic equations: 
